The change in Al-Saud’s tone towards Iran

BY: Mohammad Ghaderi

The change in Al-Saud's tone towards Iran

PEJOURNAL – Recently, some media outlets, citing Iraqi sources, reported on the talks between Iran and Al-Saud in Baghdad, which it seems that the Al-Kazemi government was seeking to exploit it politically and create a special position for itself in this regard.

However; Although both Tehran and Riyadh have denied the news, the frequency of the news could raise suspicions of some kind of dialogue, especially since we have recently seen a change in the tone of Saudi officials on Iran, as the Saudi Crown Prince called for the two countries to prevail in a televised interview. “We do not want the situation in Iran to be difficult,” he said, referring to differences that have divided the region.

Of course, in recent years, Iran, with the logic that competition between countries should not hinder their cooperation, has consistently stated its willingness to talk to the Saudi regime to resolve existing misunderstandings, but they were not willing to do so, but apparently this is happening.

The point is that; While it is necessary to distinguish between “change of tone and tactics” and “change of strategy” by Al-Saud’s court, it is inevitable to pay attention to the developments of the past decade and what caused this change of tone, what may be the current of opposition media distorting reality?

“Al-Saud did not win in Yemen, they did not win in Syria, they did not win in Lebanon,” said Gregory Gauss, head of international affairs at END Texas. “The confrontation policy with Iran has not really been successful, and the failure of this confrontation policy has probably led to a reconsideration of Al-Saud’s position.”

It seams; The change in Al-Saud’s approach should be analyzed in the light of common stereotypes and based on “cost-benefit calculation” and should not be seen solely as a result of the Biden administration’s alleged change of attitude towards Iran and JCPOA, as Riyadh is at the height of JCPOA negotiations with the Obama administration. He tried hard to block the agreement, both publicly and privately, and even after JCPOA, he refused to change this approach.

It is important to note that Al-Saud, at the height of the Trump-era sanctions and full US support for Iran, failed to succeed in its offensive strategies in the region and in disputes with Iran, despite heavy financial and credit costs. Therefore, the support or non-support of the United States cannot be the main reason for their recent change of approach.

The shift in Al-Saud’s view of resolving differences with Iran began with the administration of Adel Abdul Mahdi and his continued efforts when Trump was still President of the United States and even felt so powerful that he committed an unprecedented crime against Martyr General Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Mohandes and another group of resistance commanders fought.

Certainly, this contradiction is the main point of refutation of the hypothesis of a change in the Saudi approach for fear of Washington’s lack of support for it in the new US administration, but definitely not the focal point of their new spin.

It should be noted that foreign policy is an area of protection of national security and maximization of interests, and absolutism in it is an unwise and anti-interest action in a situation where the rapid process of change creates new conditions.

Based on what has been said; it must be acknowledged that the interaction between the two countries is naturally in the interest of the region and the Islamic world, and must continue, and that is why American-Zionist writers and media outlets such as Foreign Affairs and Haaretz have provoked the Saudis in lengthy articles, seeking to disrupt new conditions.